This volume contains contributions on different aspects of practical conflicts by: Peter Baumann Monika Betzler Ruth Chang Jon Elster Barbara Guckes Christine M. Korsgaard Isaac Levi Alfred R. Mele Joseph Raz Henry S. Richardson Peter Schaber J. David Velleman Nicholas White.

Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...) as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re‐affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re‐adapt to the environment and re‐establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we (...) better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship. On the other hand, it is precisely... (shrink)

Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the (...) following three features: the same work content or domain of activity; the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one’s work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them. (shrink)

In his Metaphysics of Morals (particularly in the Doctrine of Virtue), but also in other late works, Kant extends and refines the content of his earlier works on ethics (Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason) to a considerable extent. These revisions and extensions not only show the limitations of an exclusive interpretation of Kants ethics as a deontological ethics of principles. His thoughts are also relevant for a large number of questions of theoretical morality currently under discussion. Thus, the distinction (...) drawn in the Doctrine of Virtue between perfect and imperfect obligations informs the problem of the solvability of moral conflicts and the role of supererogatory actions. Kant goes further into the question of what it means to be a good person, what moral significance is contained in close human ties such as friendship, and what role is played by happiness and the so-called obligations towards oneself. The papers each discuss Kants central ideas in the context of his earlier writings, but also within the context of our contemporary ethical debates. Thus attention is drawn to the significance and possible extent of an ethics of virtue understood in the Kantian sense. (shrink)

Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘colleague.’ Based on the empirical evidence that (...) we present in this paper, we argue that ‘colleague’ is a dual character concept that has both a descriptive and a normative basis for categorization. Its descriptive dimension is characterized by three features, according to which two people are colleagues if they work for the same institution and know each other, or if they work for the same institution and work in the same field. An independent normative dimension is revealed, which shows that, as colleagues, we are expected to fulfill substantial normative expectations. Understanding the expectations that are encoded in the very structure of this concept is crucial to lay the groundwork for an ethics of collegiality. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...) if one subscribes to the Davidsonian standard model of action explanation. So far, philosophers have had three different reactions to this challenge. Rationalists insist that such actions can be rationalized by re-interpreting them. Arationalists insist that there simply is no reasoning process moving agents in emotional states to act. A third reaction questions the intentionality of such actions altogether. All three reactions, however, share the assumption underlying the standard account: if an agent is thought to act for a reason - and hence acts intentionally - he must entertain a desire and some means-end belief reflecting his reasoning process about how to attain what he desires by acting. In this paper, I try to show that this reflective reasoning mechanism is only one way to rationalize an action. Another way is by tracing an action to an unreflective valuing stance respresenting reasons the agent has from his point of view. Emotions are attitudes that help to grasp reasons the agent has. Since emotions come with a strong motivational potential they move the agent to act expressively. But the agent typically allows himself to do so, thereby monitoring the way in which he does it. To the extent that the agent unreflectively acts on a motive that is itself representative of his point of view, his expressive actions can be regarded as rationalizable. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...) as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re‐affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re‐adapt to the environment and re‐establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how an agent can cause and rationally guide his actions. A common approach explains an action by the agent's motives which cause and rationalize it. Given the fact that an agent does not always identify with the motives that propel him to action, the common approach does not account for an agent's autonomy in his acting. Consequently, I focus on the question whether an agent can rationally guide his action such that he controls his action (...) by his own causal powers without being just moved to it. In this endeavour, Harry Frankfurt's more recent work in which he tries to specify recalcitrant dispositions like "caring" as conditions of autonomy, and hence as conditions of an action's rational guidance, will serve me as a case in point. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 6, pp 641 - 651 During the last three decades, moral philosophy has seen an increased interest in the ethics of special relationships. The relationship that has gained the most attention in recent years is the family. While there has been some progress in understanding family relationships and their ethical implications, there is still much theoretical ground to cover. In this special issue of the Journal of Moral Philosophy, we present four papers that discuss new (...) questions concerning the rights and duties that are implied by the relationship between parents and children. These include the question whether persons have a right to parent their biological offspring, or a duty to adopt a child, rather than create one; under which circumstances dependent children owe their parents gratitude for the care they provide; and how family relationships can lead to moral blackmailing and thus to moral exploitation of some of their members. (shrink)

As driving functions become increasingly automated, motorists run the risk of becoming cognitively removed from the driving process. Psychophysiological measures may provide added value not captured through behavioral or self-report measures alone. This paper provides a selective review of the psychophysiological measures that can be utilized to assess cognitive states in real-world driving environments. First, the importance of psychophysiological measures within the context of traffic safety is discussed. Next, the most commonly used physiology-based indices of cognitive states are considered (...) as potential candidates relevant for driving research. These include: electroencephalography and event-related potentials, optical imaging, heart rate and heart rate variability, blood pressure, skin conductance, electromyography, thermal imaging, and pupillometry. For each of these measures, an overview is provided, followed by a discussion of the methods for measuring it in a driving context. Drawing from recent empirical driving and psychophysiology research, the relative strengths and limitations of each measure are discussed to highlight each measures’ unique value. Challenges and recommendations for valid and reliable quantification from lab to (less predictable) real-world driving settings are considered. Finally, we discuss measures that may be better candidates for a near real-time assessment of motorists’ cognitive states that can be utilized in applied settings outside the lab. This review synthesizes the literature on in-vehicle psychophysiological measures to advance the development of effective human-machine driving interfaces and driver support systems. (shrink)

The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...) account given by de Vignemont and Jacob—is compatible with the direct-perception view. My argument has two parts: My first step is to show that the conflict between these accounts is not—as it seems at first glance—a disagreement on the mechanism by which empathy comes about. Rather, it is due to the fact that their proponents attribute two very different roles to empathy in understanding others. My second step is to introduce Stein’s account of empathy. By not restricting empathy to either one of these two roles, her process model of empathy helps to see how the divergent intuitions that have been brought forward in the current debate could be integrated. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...) of the core expressions in a different way. I will illustrate this claim by focusing on Reddy’s and Gallagher’s accounts and argue that these authors use the notions of knowing and of understanding other minds differently than traditionally assumed. As a consequence, second person accounts thus conceived do not directly address the questions that gave rise to the theory of mind debate. They invite us, however, to critically reflect upon the way the debate has been set up. (shrink)

In an e-mail of June 2002, some women on Gender Link noticed that in Polish there is an expression, ‘husband of trust’, used to describe a person in the workplace appointed to represent workers’ interests. This role is more often than not given to women, and yet they are called ‘husbands of trust’. ‘Isn't that strange,’ they said. ‘Isn't it time to change this?’. It is. The change in gender role identities has started with questioning the language. It has started (...) with asking who has produced and is reproducing the language, and for whom. The journey has not stopped there. From looking at language it has continued through social stereotypes, work, labour, money and the division of power, and reached the law and legal system itself. In Poland, the path has been rather circuitous and uneasy for we are, more than many other countries, bound by Catholic tradition mingled with apparent freedom. We had the ethos of Solidarity, and Lech Wałęsa. Wałęsa had a badge of the Virgin Mary, Mother of Jesus on his jacket, which somehow helped label all Polish women, even those still very young, a ‘Mother Pole’. To resist that identity one needed to look beneath the image and be brave enough to call oneself just a woman. This article will try to analyse that process. (shrink)

On the issue of abortion, Ireland and Poland have been among the most conservative countries in Europe. Their legal and cultural approaches to this issue have been deeply influenced by the institution of the Catholic Church and its purported role as a defender of an authentic national identity. However, their political climates for abortion reform are increasingly divergent: Ireland has liberalised its abortion law substantially since 2018, while Poland is moving towards further criminalisation with the repeated introduction of restrictive laws (...) in parliament. Both have seen active pro-choice movements who mobilise for reform and widespread non-compliance with their restrictive abortion laws, but the policy impact of these trends varies significantly. What accounts for this difference? This article draws on comparative analysis of Ireland and Poland to assess their divergent trajectories on abortion reform, arguing that the most significant driver of change between the two is the disparity in influence of the Catholic Church on politics and policymaking. (shrink)

Adam Noga, in his review of the theory of entrepreneurship, distinguishes 24 different types of goals which make entrepreneurs establish, run and develop their enterprises. He emphasizes that the maximization of profits, sales volume, satisfactory profits, flow and value were the goals enterprises strived for until the 1970’s. However, entrepreneurship, according to Noga, consists of discovering new targets and objectives which accompany the process of enterprise creation and development, including the growth in the usefulness of human, intellectual and social (...) assets. In order to meet such expectations, appropriate social and or-ganizational conditions need to be ensured. One of these essential conditions is a suitable organizational culture, to a large extent depending on the owners and top rank managers, which con-firms that, today, growth is determined by social capital, human capital, man-agement and organizational culture. This subject is important both from the scientific and practical point of view. It shows that when it comes to management, economy lacks knowledge concerning the cultural context, as well as knowledge related to the assessment of social welfare, in which too little attention is paid to the qualitative elements of social and economic development. The aim of this paper is to answer the ques-tion whether an organizational culture which facilitates undertaking non-business activities exists. In order to answer this question, the notions of non-business activities and organizational culture have been defined. Characteristic features of an organizational culture have been presented and the culture which theoretically facilitates undertaking non-business activities has been indicated. In the empirical part, the theoretical assumptions have been verified and an organizational culture which attempts to achieve not only business goals has been identified. (shrink)

Reviews/interviews Capital Ellowen Deeowen: A Review of The Making of London: London in Contemporary Literature by Sebastian Groes - Adam Sumera Deconstruction and Liberation: A Review of Simon Glendinning’s Derrida - Wit Pietrzak Authenticity, Transdifference, Survivance: Native American Identity Masked: A Review of Native Authenticity: Transnational Perspectives on Native American Literary Studies, ed. Deborah L. Madsen - Monika Kocot Literature, the Arab Diaspora, Gender and Politics - Fadia Faqir Speaks with Maria Assif Absent Fathers, Outsider Perspectives (...) and Yiddish Typewriters - Norman Ravvin Talks to Krzysztof Majer. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to reflect on the valuing dimension of the category of the rationality of science, ontological and epistemological problems. Such problems should be solved should rationality be deemed a valuing category. Taking into consideration the discussions on the valuing character of the categories in ethics (good, evil) and the significance of moral judgements as the point of departure, I am posing a question about the importance of expressions with regard to the rationality of science, expressions treated (...) as valuing expressions. Since the beginning of the reflections on science until now it has contained valuing and normative elements. This was irrespective of whether it took the form of logic, epistemology, methodology or philosophy of science. Moreover, the above disciplines were treated as, of their nature, formulating the ideal of knowledge and providing rules of a valuing cognition. In the twentieth century the central concept on which the discussions focused was the category of rationality. The question was how to define a valuable scientific knowledge and how to pursue science. We find some problems when we want to interpret the category of rationality as a valuing category. These problems seem to be good examples of questions that should be answered, while interpreting other epistemic categories as valuing. Including the category of the rationality of science in the valuing categories is tantamount to the conferral of a valuing sense on the statements about the rationality of science, the predicator ,,rational\" and its antonyms. The standpoints in question, the interpretations of valuing statements are as follows: anti-naturalism, naturalism, cognitivism, and acognitivism. They answer such questions as: 1) what kind of feature is rationality? 2) what are its relationships with other features, in particular with the features examined by the natural, or broadly, empirical sciences? 3) does the feature of being rational or the relationship of being a good reason on behalf of something really exist? 4) what kind of predicator of the predicator ,,rational\" and its antonyms? 5) what are their relations to other predicators, in particular those predicators which the natural, or broadly, empirical sciences make use of? 6) what kind of propositions are the statements about the rationality of science? 7) what do the statements about the rationality of science denote, or do they denote anything really existing? 8) what are the relationships of the statements of the rationality of science to other statements, in particular the statements formulated by natural sciences, e.g. cognitive psychology? The review of various manners by which to use the category of rationality in the philosophy of science speaks on behalf of the rejection of extreme interpretations: both extremely cognitivist and acognitivist. In the statements about rationality there are now two components: descriptive (object-related) and valuing. The valuing component may be understood in at least three inseparable and often coexisting manners: approving/disapproving, perfectionist and normative. (shrink)

Peer review is widely recognized as a mechanism for quality control of academic content. This research article aims at comparing the review reports and decisions of reviewers who are members of the editorial board of the European Scientific Journal with those reviewers suggested by the authors and who are not affiliated with the journal. 457 review reports on 378 papers submitted to the ESJ in the period of October–December 2017 were analysed. Statistical methods including OLS and Wilcoxon (...) rank-sum test were applied based on the score approach toward the reviewers’ assessments of the papers and their characteristics related to the country, gender, and time of revisions. Results show the difference between the decisions these two groups of reviewers made. Even though editor-suggested and author-suggested reviewers need equal time to review a paper, the former are less favourable towards the authors of the papers. It is also concluded that factors such as time and country of the reviewers influence their decisions. In this regard, the editors should avoid relying their decisions solely on review reports received from reviewers suggested by the authors. However, further research with larger sample sizes should be conducted. (shrink)

This is a review of Monika Michalowska's critical edition of question 3 from Richard Kilvington's questions commentary on the Sentences by Peter Lombard. It is published in open access under a CC BY 4.0 license.

This short essay reviews R.A. Mall's 'Indische Philosophie: Vom Denkweg zum Lebensweg' (2012) and Jonardon Ganeri's 'Identity as Reasoned Choice' (2012). It works out some basic assumptions shared by both the books.

'Minds Without Fear' attempts to showcase the intellectual agency of Anglophone Indian philosophers living under coloniality. The book’s thirteen chapters are framed by the acute professional anxiety many of them experienced then, and its rippling effects which continue till today. Like their predecessors, contemporary Indian philosophers worry that colonialism has crippled their intellectual abilities. Authors Nalini Bhushan and Jay Garfield argue that this anxiety is simply a type of “false consciousness” (38).

I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things. * This is the third in a series of four papers on narrative self-conceptions and their role in moral motivation. In the first paper, “The Self as Narrator” (to appear in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, ed. Joel Anderson and John Christman), I explore the motivational role of narrative self-conceptions, (...) drawing on Daniel Dennett’s notion of the self as a “center of narrative gravity”. In the second paper, “Willing the Law” (in Practical Conflicts, ed. Monika Betzler and Peter Baumann [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming]), I explore the role of selfconceptions in Kantian “conflicts in the will”, drawing on Christine Korsgaard’s notion of “practical identities”. In a fourth paper, “A Sense of Self” (ms), I explore the role of narrative self-con-ceptions in Kantian “conflicts in conception”, drawing on the work of Thomas Nagel and John Perry on the self. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page W1-W2.